Objectivity: A Feminist Revisit by Bartlett, Katharine T.
OBJECTIVITY: A FEMINIST REVISIT
Katharine T. Bartlett*
I. OBJECTIVITY: THE TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT ....................... 376
II. OBJECTIVITY: THE FEMINIST CRITIQUES .......... ............... 377
A. Liberal Feminists: Correcting Stereotypes ....... ........ 377
B. Nonsubordination Feminists: Exploding the Myth of
Objectivity ......................................... 380
C. Positionality Feminists: Reconceptualizing Truth as
Partial and Situated. ....................... ...... 382
III. RATIONALITY: THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE CRITIQUES ...... ...... 384
IV. POSITIONALITY .............................................. 388
V. CONCLUSION .......................................... ....... 393
I am greatly honored to be invited to give the Daniel Meador Lecture.
Dean Meador was a visionary in legal education, a prolific legal scholar,
and an extraordinary public servant. To give a lecture in his name is a
daunting privilege.
I come at this year's topic of objectivity as a feminist legal scholar.
Feminists have had a love-hate relationship with objectivity and, in both
the loving and the hating, have produced insights that are useful for
thinking about objectivity more broadly. In this lecture I try to draw out
and consolidate these insights. I start by briefly summarizing the traditional
account of objectivity, which posits a close, symbiotic relationship between
objectivity and rationality, as well as a dichotomy between objectivity and
such things as bias and emotion. I then review the various critiques of
objectivity that have emerged from feminist scholarship. These critiques
have focused, in various ways, both on the failure of the law to be objective
and on how the concept of objectivity can function to obscure truth rather
than to expose it. I then draw on behavioral science findings that call into
question conventional understandings of human rationality, and sketch out
the implications of this research with respect to objectivity. I conclude by
identifying and defending a view of objectivity that is informed by, but is
* A. Kenneth Pye Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. My thanks go to the
University of Alabama School of Law for inviting me to give this lecture, and to its faculty and students
for questions and suggestions that helped me to improve it. I also thank philosopher Harvey Siegel for
patiently reading an early draft and steering me in the right direction for some of the relevant
philosophy.
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not the exclusive property of, feminist thought. This view recognizes the
many barriers to objectivity and also the obligation to pursue it.
I. OBJECTIVITY: THE TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT
Objectivity is the quality of approaching decisions and truth claims
without the influence of personal preference, self-interest, and emotion.
The question of whether a decision or claim is objective can arise in law,
morality, science, and any other area in which being "right" matters.
We have few means to assure objectivity in the law. In an ideal,
Rawlsian world, rules would be enacted, interpreted, and applied under
circumstances in which the decision makers are blind to how the rules and
their applications might someday apply to them.' In the real world, we
settle for more imperfect mechanisms to advance objectivity, some of
which rely on the decision makers themselves. For example, we ask juries
to not be swayed by "mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling," 2 and we ask judges to recuse
themselves when they have a personal stake in the outcome of case that
might interfere with applying a rule without bias in favor of or against any
party.3 Importantly, we do not ask objectivity from all legal actors equally,
or in the same way. For example, we ask legal advocates to represent the
interests of their clients, and legislators to represent the interests of their
constituents. Still, we expect-or at least hope-that these institutional
roles will produce fair and even-handed outcomes, by which we mean that
they are justified apart from partisan interests and preferences. In other
words, setting aside individual interests and preferences remains a high
ideal of the law.
While objectivity refers generally to the quality of distance or remove,
its assumed value is not distance for its own sake, but rather the improved
accuracy it produces. Objectivity promotes accuracy, according to the
traditional account, because people are fundamentally rational beings,
meaning they are drawn to propositions that make the most sense of the
available evidence.4 The assumption that people are drawn to making sense
of things is a crucial one. If people are rational, when they set aside their
personal interests they will gravitate toward the truth.5 Indeed, if everyone
1. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (Belknap Press rev. ed. 1999) (1971).
2. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 539 (1986) (setting forth "anti-sympathy instruction").
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2012) (setting forth standards for judicial recusal).
4. See generally NICHOLAS RESCHER, OBJECTIVITY: THE OBLIGATIONS OF IMPERSONAL REASON
(1997).
5. A leading philosophical account of objectivity describes objectivity and rationality largely in
relation to each other. See id. at I (defining as objective "to proceed as other intelligent people would
do in my place"); see also id. at 7 (objectivity amounts to "doing everything that can reasonably be
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set aside their personal interests and predilections, they should converge on
the same truths. If people are not rational, however, setting aside their
personal interests will not necessarily lead them either to a better result, or
to the conclusion reached by others who have also set aside their personal
interests.
II. OBJECTIVITY: THE FEMINIST CRITIQUES
Since the 1980s and 1990s, feminists-whom I define broadly as those
who believe that gender-based inequality is an important problem in this
society that we should try to solve-have challenged legal and societal
norms on objectivity grounds. This section reviews three different sorts of
challenges.
A. Liberal Feminists: Correcting Stereotypes
In law review articles published in 19756 and 1978,7 women's rights
advocate and now-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg laid out the outlines of a
theory that bears primary responsibility for much of the legal reform in
recent decades that has enhanced the rights of women. The theory, referred
to as liberal feminism, equal rights feminism, or formal equality, challenges
laws and practices that discriminate on the basis of sex on the grounds that
they are based on false assumptions or stereotypes about women.8 Some of
the stereotypes attacked by liberal feminists are descriptive, such as
generalizations that women are physically weaker, more nurturing,
dependent upon men, and not as committed to the workplace as men.9
Others are prescriptive, such as the normative proposition that women
belong in the home and not the workplace.10 Liberal feminists believe that
equal opportunity for women requires correcting both descriptive and
prescriptive stereotypes and eliminating the laws and practices based upon
expected ... to honor the demands of rationality."). See also RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY,
RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 21-22 (1991) (describing tradition in Western
culture of idea of Truth to be pursued for its own sake, and derived from objectivity rather than from
within one's human community).
6. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 23 (1975).
7. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV. 451
(1978).
8. See id. at 451-60.
9. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (successfully challenging a military
benefits scheme that assumed that wives were dependent upon their husbands and not vice versa).
10. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (successfully challenging state statutes
specifying older age of majority for males than for females, which assumed that men should provide for
their families, and thus needed to be supported longer by their parents in order to prepare to do so, while
women were expected to marry earlier and be supported by their husbands).
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them." Even if a stereotype has some basis in fact, liberal feminists insist
on the right of each woman to be treated as an individual and to be given
the stereotype-free opportunity to prove that she satisfies appropriate, sex-
neutral criteria.12
Liberal feminists oppose not only rules and practices that explicitly
restrict women's opportunities, but also those that protect women or give
them preferential treatment. 1 For liberal feminists, the insistence on sex-
neutrality is not just a matter of fairness to men; it is also strategic. Despite
the short-term advantages that sex-based protective or preferential
treatment might provide, liberal feminists believe that special, favorable
treatment relies on, and thereby perpetuates, the same stereotypes as rules
and practices that discriminate against them. In the long term, only by
eliminating all stereotypes will women be free of the restrictions those
common stereotypes help to justify.14
For liberal feminists, restricting opportunities for women based on
stereotypes about them is irrational on democracy's own terms.15 In this
sense, they agree with John Stuart Mill, who saw liberal democracy's
unequal treatment of women as a "solitary breach"l 6 in an otherwise fair,
highly principled system. Ensuring that women are treated the same as men
is the liberal feminist repair to this breach.
Notwithstanding the considerable success of liberal feminist principles
against many forms of sex-based discrimination, feminist theorists have
identified various deficiencies or limitations in the approach. 7  One
11. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 23; Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 459.
12. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 6. Examples of Supreme Court cases based on this principle
include Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating male tie-breaker preference for selection of
estate administrators, which was based on the assumption that men were better able to handle business
matters), and United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (finding it unconstitutional to deny women
admission to the Virginia Military Institute, which denial was based on the assumption that women
could not succeed at the school and would alter the experience men received).
13. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts,
and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 186-90, 194-99 (1982).
14. See, e.g., id. at 191, 195-96. Examples of Supreme Court cases that invalidated laws that, on
the surface at least, favored women, include Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating sex-specific
alimony laws), Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (invalidating women-only state
nursing school), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating lower drinking age for women).
In addition to the benefits of reducing stereotypes about women, of course, these cases also helped to
reduce stereotypes about men.
15. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 13, at 175-79, 199 (tracing the elimination by courts of rules
based on irrational stereotypes and questioning remaining rules that rely on such stereotypes).
16. JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 19 (Edward Alexander ed., Transaction
Publishers 2001) (1869) (arguing that the "social subordination of women . .. stands out an isolated fact
in modem social institutions; a solitary breach of what has become their fundamental law; a single relic
of an old world of thought and practice exploded in everything else.").
17. For a further examination of feminist alternatives to the liberal feminist model, see Katharine
T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Scholarship: A History Through the Lens of the California Law Review, 100
CAL. L. REv. 381 (2012).
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limitation is that liberal feminism proceeds on a case-by-case basis, one
irrationality at a time, without a theory to address the larger system within
which these stereotypes function. Relatedly, liberal feminism is reluctant to
hold people and institutions accountable for background inequities they did
not create. As a result of these limitations, liberal feminism has difficulty in
practice addressing general inequities or systemic failures based on
multiple layers of stereotypes, for which no single actor is responsible. For
example, although liberal feminists have insisted on the principle of equal
pay for equal work, this principle has not reached pay disparities beyond
one-on-one comparisons between men and women in the same job. Liberal
feminist principles do not provide a way to address gross disparities in pay
between jobs filled mostly by men (like firefighters, truck drivers and work
in the construction trades), and jobs filled mostly by women (like teachers
and secretaries)18 -disparities that are typically explained by courts as a
function of "neutral" market factors rather than as discrimination.19 Even in
similar jobs, liberal feminism has not supplied a theory for preventing pay
differences based on background factors that themselves reflect gender
stereotypes or bias. So, for example, courts have justified higher pay for the
coaches of men's collegiate basketball teams than coaches of women's
teams, based on the extra work associated with the revenue-generating
potential of the men's teams-a potential rooted in the public's preference
for male basketball, over which courts assume colleges and universities
have no control. 2 0 The same inability to reach discrimination grounded in
the broader societal patterns has meant the continuation of such practices as
sex-specific employer dress and appearance standards, which are justified
as a product of "neutral" community standards,21 sex-Specific hiring
restrictions in prisons, which are explained by the prejudices of prisoners or
18. Women constitute 97% of preschool and kindergarten teachers, 96% of secretaries and
administrative assistants, and 80% of social workers, but only 4% of firefighters, 3% of truck drivers,
and less than 2% of electricians, carpenters, and other construction trades. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN'S EARNINGS IN 2010, REPORT 1031, at 10-35 tbl.2 (July 2011),
available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2010.pdf.
19. See, e.g., Am. Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that Title VII
requires equal pay for equal work, not "comparable worth").
20. See, e.g., Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd, 178 F.3d 1069 (9th
Cir. 1999).
21. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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their guards,22 and hiring limitations in therapeutic settings, which are
defended by the gender preferences of patients.23
B. Nonsubordination Feminists: Exploding the Myth of Objectivity
While liberal feminists focus on the irrationality or lack of objectivity
of stereotypes about women, many feminists have attempted to get at the
more structural sources of gender inequity. Nonsubordination theory,
dominance theory, or what Catharine MacKinnon calls feminism
"unmodified" 24 sees the whole legal and social order as having been
deliberately designed to subordinate women to the interests of men.2 5 Key
to preserving this design is the appearance of objectivity, which legitimates
men's power as simply the way things are, while trivializing women's
efforts to change the status quo as special pleadings. Sex inequality, for
nonsubordination theorists, is not just the result of some aberrational or
irrational factual misunderstandings about women that can be easily
corrected by better application of existing legal principles. 26 In fact, the
system is fully rational-"metaphysically nearly perfect"27 -in the sense
that all of its parts fit and support the whole. The problem is that this whole
reflects and perpetuates an objectivity that is decidedly male.
Men's physiology defines most sports, their needs define auto and
health insurance coverage, their socially designed biographies
define workplace expectations and successful career patterns, their
22. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding exclusion of women from
maximum-security guard positions because they would be potential targets of sexual assault by
prisoners); Everson v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 391 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding exclusion of male
guards from women's prisons, based on concern for sexual misconduct by male officers). But see
Breiner v. Nev. Dep't of Corr., 610 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that concern for sexual
misconduct does not justify exclusion of male guards from female prisons).
23. See, e.g., Healy v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1996) (permitting
sex as BFOQ for psychiatric hospital staff whose jobs included bathing and other sensitive tasks for
emotionally disturbed and sexually molested children and adolescents); Jones v. Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666
F. Supp. 933, 935 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (upholding sex-based hiring of male and female nurse assistants
and orderlies whose job responsibilities included viewing or touching private parts of patients); Fesel v.
Masonic Home Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979)
(upholding policy against hiring men as nurses in a therapeutic setting in which patients preferred
female nurses). But see EEOC v. Hi40 Corp., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 301, 303-04 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (holding
that sex is not a BFOQ for hiring of weight-loss counselors, even though employees were primarily
female and uncomfortable with male counselors taking their measurements); Slivka v. Camden-Clark
Memorial Hospital, 594 S.E.2d 616 (W. Va. 2004) (striking down hospital policy to hire only female
obstetrics nurses, despite evidence that 80 percent of patients demanded female nurses).
24. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
16 (1987).
25. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 644 (1983).
26. Id. at 644-45.
27. Id. at 638.
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perspectives and concerns define quality in scholarship, their
experiences and obsessions define merit, their objectification of life
defines art, their military service defines citizenship, their presence
defines family, their inability to get along with each other-their
wars and rulerships-defines history, their image defines god, and
their genitals define sex.28
The male perspective not only limits the terms on which women have
access to public goods such as employment and education. According to
MacKinnon, it also sets the terms of private relationships, determining who
can do what to whom and thereby sanctioning acts of violence and abuse
against women. It defines sex and even sexual desire. For men, sex is
penetration and orgasm; for women, sex means being used the way men
use women, and enjoying it.2 9 The genius of the system is that concepts
such as sexual freedom and reproductive rights seem to prove liberal
democracy's commitment to autonomy while, in fact, these concepts allow
women the freedom only to express the sexuality men have assigned to
them, for men's own purposes. 30 MacKinnon argues that even the right to
have access to birth control and abortion subordinates women to men, by
removing the excuse women may have once had to refuse men's sexual
demands.3 1
For nonsubordination theorists, the way out of the objectivity trap is
not more facts and rigorous reasoning, as liberal feminists assume, but a
different epistemological orientation. 32  Appropriating "standpoint
epistemology" from Marx, who saw the oppressed proletariat as the best
source of knowledge about their oppression by the owners of the means of
production, MacKinnon reasons that the reality of the male subordination
of women can be recognized only by taking seriously women's accounts of
their experiences. 3 3 Women's perspectives-and women's perspectives
alone-can reveal that what passes for objectivity in a male-dominated
society is objective only from the male perspective. Other feminist theorists
have expanded this epistemological stance into a more general theory of
outsider knowledge. Mari Matsuda, for example, argues that "outsider
28. MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 36 (internal footnote omitted).
29. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 133 (1989).
30. Id. at 133, 185.
31. MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 99.
32. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Methods, and the State: An Agenda for
Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982).
33. MacKinnon's borrowing from Marx is explicit. See, e.g., id.; MacKinnon, supra note 25.
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perspectives" are necessary to produce the open inquiry, empathy, and
critical thinking that produces any kind of knowledge.34
The notion that the perspectives of victims give them special access to
the truth has been a powerful one in feminist thought, although it is widely
acknowledged that MacKinnon's epistemology proves too much. What
does taking women's experiences seriously mean when not all women
experience oppression by men in their lives? According to MacKinnon, the
reason that all women do not recognize their oppression is a testament to
how well men have constructed women to see the world through men's
36
eyes. In accepting the roles assigned to them by men, women show just
how strong a grip the male perspective has on them.37 But if knowledge is
experience-based and people have different accounts of their own
experiences, who is to say which one is real or true? MacKinnon's false
consciousness script-however convincing as a theory-would appear to
be no less unfalsifiable and no less stacked, methodologically, than the
male system she critiques.
C. Positionality Feminists: Reconceptualizing Truth as Partial and
Situated
While the nonsubordination critique focuses on the partiality of the
male perspective, other legal feminists rely on theories that stress the
partiality and social constructedness of all knowledge. From the
"postmodern" view, the problem is not just that the present rules of the
world are irrational in many details, as liberals would have it, or that they
are non-objective at the male-specific core, as feminist standpoint
epistemologists contend. 39 The problem is that there is no Archimedean
34. See, e.g., Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in
Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1988); Mari J. Matsuda, Who is Excellent?, 1 SEATTLE
J. Soc. JUST. 29 (2003); see also Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987). For the application of this methodological
commitment in critical race studies, see generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1996); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A
NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002). Specifically, for the application at
the intersection of crucial race theory and critical feminism, see CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER
(Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2003).
35. See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, Sexual Diference, the Feminine, and Equivalency: A Critique of
MacKinnon 's Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 100 YALE L.J. 2247, 2262-63 (1991) (book
review).
36. MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 29-30.
37. Id.
38. See Katharine T. Bartlett, MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose Terms?, 75 CALIF. L.
REV. 1559, 1562-64 (1987); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 620
n. 11 (1990). See also MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM, at xx (1992) ("While
MacKinnon stresses the importance of perspective, perspective, for her, is unitary.").
39. See supra notes 8-16 and 25-31 and accompanying text.
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standpoint from which it is meaningful to think in terms of objectivity; any
claim to truth or "objectivity" is the product of a limited set of experiences
and perspective.4 0
As many have observed, the strong version of postmodernism is
difficult to reconcile with feminism itself; how can feminists claim that
objectivity has no ground to stand on, while themselves making truth
claims about the injustice of existing laws and practices? 41 Accordingly,
instead of buying into the full logic of postmodernism, postmodern legal
feminists have deconstructed some of the most significant "givens" of the
legal system, showing that what appears as objective is, in fact, constructed
within a very specific set of power dynamics, linguistic conventions, and
social norms, while leaving room for alternative, preferable norms. 42
When I wrote about feminist methods in 1990,4 3 I argued that
postmodern insights about the nature of truth are most productive when
combined with some of the core claims of liberal feminists and standpoint
epistemologists. The particular combination I discussed corresponded to a
stance that feminist philosophers of science at the time called
"positionality."44 Positionality recognizes, like standpoint epistemologies,
that what passes for objective truth tends to reflect the interests of those
with the power to define what is objective, and that repositioning the
viewpoint of the oppressed can help to expose the non-naturalness of
certain societal givens.4 5 It does not assume, however, that any other single
perspective, including the perspective of victims, can produce a substitute,
dispositive truth. Positionality builds on the social constructivist view that
truth claims are always from a certain perspective and always specific to
the particular set of methods and conditions that produced them. 46 At the
same time, positionality endorses the liberal commitment to the possibility
of improving what we know through more rigorous truth-seeking, as if
there is such a thing as truth to be improved upon. Positionality recognizes
that it is not enough to be suspicious of objectivity; we must also be
committed to trying to achieve it.4 7 It views truth as contingent, partial, and
provisional, but worth seeking as if it, in fact, exists.48
40. The best representative of the feminist postmodern perspective is Mary Joe Frug. See FRUG,
supra note 38.
41. See Rhode, supra note 38, at 620 (addressing the "awkward position" for feminists in
"maintaining that gender oppression exists while challenging our capacity to document it").
42. A number of these critiques are gathered in Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods,
103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 830 n.2 (1990).
43. Id. at 829-88.
44. See id. at 880-87.
45. See id. at 885-87.
46. See id. at 880-81.
47. See id. at 885-86.
48. See id. at 880-81, 884-87.
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Before discussing positionality in more detail, I return to the concept of
rationality. As noted earlier,4 9 the standard account of objectivity assumes
that objectivity is the condition that enables reason to flourish; when people
set aside their self-interests, they come to see what others see if they, too,
set aside their self-interests. The three feminist perspectives I have
described have different positions about the feasibility of setting aside self-
interest, but they seem to agree that to the extent this is possible, rationality
would take the place of self-interest. But what if that assumption is flawed?
What if human rationality is infected not only by self-interest but also by
systematic cognitive errors? What if these errors lead people systematically
to see things differently from one another, and thus move away from, rather
than toward, a convergent truth? What if objectivity requires not only that
people set aside their material interests, but also fundamental
characteristics in the way they think and reason?
III. RATIONALITY: THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE CRITIQUES
The confidence generally assumed about objectivity promoting
rationality fits uneasily with behavioral science and neuroscience research
about how humans process information. This research-now well-known
and reasonably well-accepted-reveals, in various ways, that closeness to
one's subject is not the only barrier to rationality; it is perhaps not even the
primary one.50 In addition, people's brains function in ways that cause them
often to process information in irrational, non-truth-seeking ways.
The behavioral research to which I refer covers a broad terrain. It
includes research showing that we tend to process information in categories
defined by characteristics that are salient to us, and that those categories
affect how we perceive others. We tend to attribute traits to people and
things according to the category-or stereotype-to which they belong
rather than according to their actual traits. When we stereotype, we
perceive people or things within the same category as more alike than if the
category did not exist, and those in different categories as more different.5
Moreover, we observe, remember, and assess new information to confirm
our stereotypes, rather than to correct them.52 Typically, when we confront
evidence that conflicts with a stereotype we hold, we do not tend to revise
our beliefs about the group; instead, we dismiss the conflicting evidence as
49. See supra Section 1.
50. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation
in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REv. 1893, 1904-11 (2009).
51. SAMUEL L. GAERTNER & JOHN F. DOVIDIO, REDUCING INTERGROUP BIAS: THE COMMON
INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL 35 (2000). Other sources about the effects of categorization are summarized
in Bartlett, supra note 50, at 1908-11.
52. GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 22-24 (1954).
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evidence of an exceptional case.53 For example, if we believe that women
are the ones who generally take care of small children, we generally do not
alter this assumption when we see men taking care of children; instead, we
process these fathers as exceptions to the rule and thereby preserve the
underlying generalization.
The human tendency to categorize combines with our tendency to
divide people into groups to which we belong and groups to which we do
not belong-ingroups and outgroups. Decades ago, Gordon Allport
explained that this identification is a major source of racial prejudice.54
When we organize people into "we" and "they," we exaggerate the positive
attributes of the groups with whom we identify and the negative attributes
of outgroup members.55 Again, counter-examples do not cause us to revise
our stereotypes. We view a smart, high-achieving individual who is a
member of a group with whom we identify as an exemplar of our group,
whereas we view a smart, high-achieving individual from an outgroup as
an outlier of that group. 6
The tendency to confirm the stereotypes we hold is part of a larger
tendency to process information in ways that confirm our existing beliefs
rather than test and improve them. According to Jonathan Haidt, who gave
the Meador Lecture here in 2010, we typically make up our minds first and
then select the reasons that best support our chosen result. Let's say, for
example, that we hear about research claiming that the fetus has feeling at,
say, twenty weeks, or that women frequently regret having the abortions
they have. Faced with evidence of either or both of these things, few
individuals are likely to actually reassess their views on abortion. More
likely, they make the new findings fit what they already believe, either
accepting these propositions as true if they oppose abortion or dismissing
them as bad science if they think women should have reproductive choice.
When our identity is defined through the groups with whom we
identify, the commitment to that identity motivates us to accept the dogma
53. See Steven L. Neuberg, Expectancy-Confirmation Processes in Stereotyped-Tinged Social
Encounters: The Moderating Role of Social Goals, in 7 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE: THE
ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 103, 106, 108 (Mark P. Zanna & James M. Olson eds., 1994); see also Bartlett,
supra note 50, at 1910-12.
54. ALLPORT, supra note 52, at 107-28.
55. See id. at 29-67; see also GAERTNER & DOVIDIO, supra note 51, at 36-39; Marilynn B.
Brewer, The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?, 55 J. SOC. ISSUES 429, 430
(1999).
56. For the literature on this general phenomenon, see Miles Hewstone, The "Ultimate
Attribution Error?": A Review of the Literature on Intergroup Attributions, 20 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL.
311 (1990).
57. Jonathan Haidt, Moral Psychology and the Law: How Intuitions Drive Reasoning, Judgment,
and the Search for Evidence, 64 ALA. L. REV. 867 (2013); see also JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS
MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 27-51 (2012) [hereinafter HAIDT,
THE RIGHTEOUS MIND].
3852014]
Alabama Law Review
of these groups.58 This motivation transcends the rationality of that dogma.
It also gives opinion leaders the power to shape our assessment of facts and
evidence. Those who associate themselves with the world view of, say,
Rush Limbaugh, or Rachel Maddow, allow these figures to filter the news
for them and order it to fit the assumptions and norms to which they
already subscribe. When people change their views, it is often because
individuals with whom they identify point them in a new direction,59 even
if these "leaders" are not actually experts. The fans of Shaquille O'Neal
take note, for example, when he says they can trust Chris Christie,60 while
Chris Christie helps to restore President Obama's image by praising his
response to Hurricane Sandy.61
Authority, in turn, helps to create the truth that it asserts. Consider
Justice Kennedy's graphic concern for women who come to regret their
decision to have an abortion.62 Being told that women experience great
anguish and profound sorrow when they have an abortion tends to increase
the anguish that women have, or think they will have, when they make that
decision. Conversely, the earlier authority of Roe v. Wade63 shaped many
women's understanding of abortion as a morally neutral medical
procedure.6 In each case, authoritative assumptions provided social cues
that likely have more impact than rational thought on women's experience
of abortion.
Other research in the behavioral sciences shows that people are not
particularly rational in assessing their own interests across a variety of
deliberative domains. For example, people tend to let their current feelings
and needs influence their assessment of how they will feel about what they
58. See HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND, supra note 57, at 189-220.
59 See id. at 68 (noting that people most often change their minds by interacting with other
people, especially "if there is affection, admiration, or a desire to please the other person").
60. See Ashley Alman, Chris Christie Scores Shaquille O'Neal Endorsement, THE HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 28, 2013, 6:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/27/chris-christie-
shaq_n 4168347.html (pre-Bridgegate).
61 See Tom Kludt, GOP Senator Blames Christie for Obama 's Re-Election, TPM LIVEWIRE,
(Nov. 11, 2013, 2:32 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/gop-senator-says-he-blames-christie-
for-obama-s-re-election.
62 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159-160 (2007) ("It is self-evident that a mother who
comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound
when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce
the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human
form.").
63 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
64 Cf Marjorie M. Shultz, Abortion and the Maternal-Fetal Conflict: Broadening Our
Concerns, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 79, 81 (1992) (expressing concern that in the abortion
debate, "extreme autonomy rhetoric and ... exclusively woman-regarding positions ... undermine our
persuasiveness ... render us vulnerable on grounds of principle, and ... damage our aspirations for a
humane and responsible world").
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will want tomorrow, and to discount the value of future rewards. They
often make economic decisions that are short-term,6 6 overreact to fads and
bubbles,67 or fail to account for the benefits of trust and collective action.68
This research takes us beyond the standard, interests-based account of
objectivity that is embedded in most accounts of objectivity, including
feminist accounts. The conventional interest-based account assumes that
our self-interests prevent us from being objective, but that setting aside our
self-interests will permit our rational selves to take over. To the extent
feminists criticize the conventional account, it is because they conclude that
self-interest runs deeper and more invisibly than is typically presumed.69
However, the behavioral research suggests that our self-interests are not the
only thing that affects our objectivity.70 Also implicated are the ways our
brains work to over-generalize, self-justify, prioritize present over future
gain, affirm rather than test what we already believe, and form beliefs
according to the groups with whom we identify.
These cognitive processes are not special flaws of just some people,
like terrorists or Republicans. 1 The research shows that all people tend to
digest information in ways that interfere with the truth-seeking process.
Jonathan Haidt explains that the particular triggers for how we digest
information are different. The "sacred cows" that determine how
conservatives process information connect to the values of family, God and
country, loyalty, the sanctity of life, and people getting what they deserve.72
Liberals process information through the lens of a commitment to
protecting victims, reducing disparities of wealth, and conserving natural
resources. Despite these differences, according to Haidt, each group has the
same tendency to digest data to confirm their own view of the world.7 3
65. The field of study that focuses on the cognitive difficulties that interfere with people's ability
to predict their wants and needs is called "affective forecasting." See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., The
Peculiar Longevity of Things Not So Bad, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 14 (2004); Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T.
Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, 35 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 345 (2003).
66. See David DeSteno, Social Emotions and Intertemporal Choice: "Hot" Mechanisms for
Building Social and Economic Capital, 18 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 280 (2009).
67. See generally ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2d ed. 2006).
68. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective
Action, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 2 (1998).
69. See, e.g., supra notes 24-30, 39-40.
70. See supra notes 50-68.
71. For an example of the view that the thought processes of Republicans are askew, see CHRIS
MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN BRAIN: THE SCIENCE OF WHY THEY DENY SCIENCE-AND REALITY
(2012).
72. HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND, supra note 57, at 288-313.
73. Id. at 128-54. Haidt does believe that Republicans hold values that make it easier to exploit
how humans think. Id. at 155-86.
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This wide array of research 74 calls into question conventional concepts
of objectivity and rationality, and the relationship between the two. The
next Part explores some of the implications.
IV. POSITIONALITY
The traditional account of objectivity presupposes that we can set our
interests aside and that doing so enables rationality to flourish, bringing us
closer to objective truth.7 5 Feminist critics of this account question the
achievement and even the achievability of objectivity, emphasizing the
various ways in which power relationships and material interests serve to
control what counts as an objective view of the world. The behavioral
research shows not only that our material interests affect our view of
77reality, but also our cognitive processes. It shows that the processes upon
which we would rely if we managed to set aside our self-interest are also
unreliable and that we use "reason" not so much to arrive at right answers,
as to justify our existing view of the world, pump up our feelings of self-
worth, and fulfill our need to belong.
We might say that, insofar as the various cognitive processes described
in the behavioral science literature fulfill various psychological and
emotional needs, these processes are, in fact, rational. If our cognitive
mistakes serve our non-rational needs, they are, one might say, rational
mistakes. The problem with this broadened view of rationality is that, so
defined, rationality no longer has the attributes that led us to value it in the
first place. Under the conventional view of objectivity, the purpose of
setting aside our self-interests is to lead us toward greater rationality, which
advances truth.78 But to the extent what counts as rationality amounts to
little more than the justification of our existing, emotion-laden, ego-needy
view of the world, we have lost the truth-seeking reasons to pursue it.
Expanding rationality to encompass the processes by which we believe
what we believe may give us a better working description of the way the
74. For present purposes, I omit another body of potentially relevant social science evidence,
which challenges the dichotomy between objectivity and emotion and suggests that emotion can play a
positive role with respect to moral judgment, and also with respect to fact-finding concerning such
things as risk or advantage, and the intentions of others. For a neuroscientific account of the positive
role that emotion can play in improving perceptions and judgment, see ANTONIO DAMASIO,
DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 34-51 (1994). Susan Bandes relies
upon Damasio's work, among others, in criticizing the legal system's efforts to exclude emotion from
legal decision making. See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Repellent Crimes and Rational Deliberation:
Emotion and the Death Penalty, 33 VT. L. REv. 489 (2009).
75. See supra notes 4-5.
76. See supra notes 24-31, 36-40.
77. See supra Section Ill.
78. See supra notes 4-5.
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brain works, but it does not inspire confidence that the truths produced by
these processes are correct ones.
To advance truth, then, we would need to transcend not only our self-
interests, but also the mental processes that motivate us to fulfill our
various psychological and emotional needs rather than to discover truth.
How should we think about this challenge?
This brings us back to positionality which is, I believe, the most useful
way of thinking about the enterprise of truth-seeking. Positionality does not
eliminate the challenges that attend the many barriers we face in
determining what is real and true. It does describe, however, the way we
should situate ourselves, both methodologically and ethically, in relation to
these barriers." Positionality combines self-skepticism with a commitment
to truth-seeking, encompassing a responsibility both for understanding our
own partiality and distorted ways of thinking and for striving to overcome
these multiple distortions. Acknowledging the limitations of truth,
positionality insists that we nonetheless are obligated to strive toward it.80
This obligation entails a commitment to explicit, defensible criteria of
knowledge. Ideally these criteria make sense even to those people who
don't come from the same perspective or who have different sacred cows-
if they too try to set aside their perspectives.
One might suppose that our ability to be certain of our truths might be
easiest in the physical sciences. There exists, after all, a tangible world;
with enough rigor, we ought to be able to describe how it works. Given this
greater concreteness, it is noteworthy that debates about the nature of truth
and truth-seeking are not significantly different in the sciences than they
are in law and other fields. In fact, feminist theorists line up roughly the
same way as they do in the fields of law and ethics. Some feminist theorists
in the sciences associate themselves with empiricism, emphasizing the need
for the rigorous testing of hypotheses. 8' Some advocate the premise of
standpoint epistemology that "starting from women's lives is a way of
gaining less false and distorted results of research." 82 Others promote a
79. Bartlett, supra note 42, at 880-81.
80. Id. at 881-86.
81. See, e.g., RUTH BLEIER, SCIENCE AND GENDER: CRITIQUE OF BIOLOGY AND ITS THEORIES
ON WOMEN (1984); Helen E. Longino, Subjects, Power, and Knowledge: Description and Prescription
in Feminist Philosophies of Science, in FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES 101 (Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth
Potter eds., 1993).
82. See Sandra Harding, "Strong Objectivity": A Response to the New Objectivity Question, 104
SYNTHESE 332, 346 (1995); see also Nancy C. M. Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the
Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism, in DISCOVERING REALITY 283 (Sandra
Harding & Merrill Hintikka eds., 1983).
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view of "situated knowledge," emphasizing that scientific truths are partial,
particular, and provisional.83
While important differences exist between these positions, the
convergences are telling. In defending empiricist methodologies, for
example, Helen Longino takes account of standpoint and other feminist
critiques of traditional science, arguing that scientific knowledge is not just
about hypotheses and empirical proofs; it is, rather, a "critical dialogue" in
which "individuals and groups holding different points of view engage with
each other."84 For Longino, scientific knowledge is constructed not by
individuals applying a method to the material to be known, as traditional
science may have envisioned, but "communities of practice" in "interaction
with one another"-including those who approach science from entirely
different angles-"in ways that modify their observations, theories and
hypotheses, and patterns of reasoning."
Likewise, Sandra Harding, who argues that scientific knowledge is a
result of conflict between different standpoints each reflecting their own
place in the society's hierarchy rather than the kind of consensus imagined
by Longino, moderates the implications of her emphasis on outsider
standpoints with qualifications drawn from other theories. She
acknowledges, for example, that feminist knowledge does not claim to be
neutral, even about the nature of women's experiences, and that while
women's lives are a source of truth, women's experiences are only the
starting point; "the answers . . . must be sought elsewhere." 86 She also
states that having a determinate location on a social matrix "does not
determine one's consciousness," and that people can work to overcome
88the blindness created by their own privilege.
Feminist philosophers of science who have aligned themselves with the
positional view of truth as partial and provisional incorporate important
aspects of both empiricism and social constructivist theories. Donna
Haraway, for example, writes that we need accounts of knowledge that
include not only the "radical historical contingency for all knowledge
claims," but also "a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a
'real' world."89 Knowledge is situated, according to Haraway, to the extent
that it is contingent on the incomplete methods used to produce it. Yet
knowledge is not meaningless. It is the best understanding we have at any
83. Donna Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege
ofPartial Perspective, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 575 (Fall 1988).
84. Longino, supra note 81, at 112.
85. Id. at 111.
86. Harding, supra note 82, at 343, 346 (emphasis omitted).
87. Id. at 345.
88. Id.
89. Haraway, supra note 83, at 579.
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one time, given the contingencies. Truth may be contingent, partial, and
provisional, but we all, including feminists, "have to insist on a better
account of the world; it is not enough to show radical historical
contingency and modes of construction for everything." 90 Karen Barad
elaborates a similar thought: "The fact that scientific knowledge is socially
constructed does not imply that science doesn't 'work', and the fact that
science 'works' does not mean that we have discovered human-
independent facts about nature."9'
Skepticism about objectivity in the sciences is hardly the exclusive
domain of feminists. Scientists widely recognize that any research occurs
within a certain set of experimental conditions-conditions that are often
hard to fully specify, even though any research results can be "right" only
within those conditions. Even knowing this, however, scientists inevitably
take much for granted, including the findings of past science, which can
easily settle into unchallenged paradigms. These paradigms are self-
reinforcing. Scientific research based on the unexamined premise that the
world is flat will reinforce the premise that the world is flat-until someone
thinks to prove it is not.
Scientists also widely accept the fact that scientific hypotheses,
although essential to scientific method, themselves tend to bias scientific
study in favor of evidence that supports these hypotheses and against
evidence that is difficult to reconcile with it. As David Goodstein has
pointed out, there is more reward in science for proving the hypothesis than
for disproving it.92 Scientists, like the rest of us, are looking to prove
themselves right. Moreover, acceptance as good science means convincing
a peer review system that represents accepted knowledge, not disruptions
of it.9 3 Recent research suggests that unchallenged, authoritative
assumptions and data biases may be more of a problem than we realize. A
well-known study by two research scientists concludes that only six out of
fifty-three landmark cancer studies could be replicated and that the results
of the other studies may not be true.9 4
A further problem is the lack of transparency in the interaction between
researcher and the object of study. Feminist scientists have argued that the
object of study cannot be a reality totally independent of the researcher.
90. Id.
91. Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Realism and Social Constructivism Without
Contradiction, in FEMINISM, SCIENCE, & THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 161, 162 (Lynn Hankinson
Nelson & Jack Nelson eds., 1997).
92. DAVID GOODSTEIN, ON FACT AND FRAUD: CAUTIONARY TALES FROM THE FRONT LINES OF
SCIENCE 12-13 (2010).
93. Id. at 9-26.
94. See C. Glenn Begley & Lee M. Ellis, Drug Development: Raise Standards for Preclinical
Cancer Research, 483 NATURE 531 (2012).
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Karen Barad addresses the ways in which the scientist is part of what he or
she observes, writing that "there is no unambiguous way to differentiate
between the 'object' and the 'agencies of observation."' 95 Scientists help to
shape the reality they observe and describe. 96 A well-known cartoon shows
Pavlov's dog, hooked up to his testing apparatus, saying to another dog
standing by, "Watch what I can make Pavlov do. As soon as I drool, he'll
smile and write in his little book."97 In real life, the tables in the science lab
are rarely so dramatically turned, but good science requires awareness of
the human agency of the scientist, whose limited and self-interested
processes of observation inevitably play a hand in the results that science
produces.98
Notwithstanding these many concerns and qualifications, feminist
scientists retain the core commitment to advancing objective knowledge.
As Donna Haraway states, "we could use some enforceable, reliable
accounts of things not reducible to power moves." 99 Karen Barad
concurs.100 Science is not separate from us, but neither is it an "arbitrary
construction."' 0 ' Finding those reliable accounts requires of researchers
what the scientific method, at its best, also demands-awareness of the
dangers of bias and cognitive misperceptions, methods that are careful not
to reject evidence simply because it does not fit the hypothesis, standards of
proof that are accountable to the community of truth-seekers, consideration
of competing perspectives, affirmative efforts to step beyond familiar
paradigms, and attention to the interaction between the researcher and the
object of research.
The way scientists have approached the limitations of the scientific
method informs how we might think about truth-seeking in other, "softer"
domains, like the law. We do not-we cannot-step entirely outside
ourselves when we write, interpret, or criticize law. What we believe to be
correct is, more than we usually recognize, the product of our interests,
cognitive handicaps, methodologies, and the givens handed down to us and
perpetuated by particular social communities. At the same time, as is the
case in science, we have a commitment to the ideal of looking beyond
ourselves, toward understandings that take better account of other
95. Barad, supra note 91, at 170 (emphasis omitted).
96. Id. at 184.
97. See Mark Stivers, Pavlov's Dog, MARKSTIVERS.COM (Dec. 12, 2008),
http://www.markstivers.com/wordpress/?p=67 (last visited April 17, 2014).
98 Barad, supra note 91, at 179-186 (explaining the theory of "agential realism" and the cultural
embodiment of science).
99. Haraway, supra note 83, at 580.
100. Barad, supra note 91, at 184-86 (describing the role of scientific concepts as between the
object and the agencies of observation).
101. Id. at 185.
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perspectives, make better sense of the evidence, and reach better solutions.
We have a commitment, in short, to objectivity.
V. CONCLUSION
When we understand the role of both self-interests and the arguably
irrational ways in which we cater to our psychological needs to belong, to
satisfy ourselves now rather than to defer gratification, and to affirm what
we already believe, there are two broad paths to follow: (1) We can
abandon objectivity in order to pursue our own self-interests-after all,
what else is there?1 02 or (2) we can decide that, despite the roadblocks to
achieving objectivity, it is a meaningful goal worth pursuing.
I hope I've convinced you that door number two-the positionality
door-is the more attractive one. Overconfidence in our objectivity and
excessive cynicism about it are both truth-suppressing, although for
different reasons. When we are too sure about our objectivity, we take
things conveniently for granted, neglecting the obligation to identify and
defend our assumptions and our criteria for truth and to recognize
alternative perspectives. When we are too cynical, we also neglect the
obligation to look beyond our own perspectives; since we don't think
objectivity exists, or we believe it exists only to maintain existing power
relationships, there seems little reason to search for it.
Positionality tries to have it both ways, which is the way we should try
to have it-recognizing the limitations of our own objectivities, yet
accepting the obligation to justify ourselves in terms intelligible from
outside our limitations.
Does the positionality stance matter to the likelihood of advancing the
truth? I think so.10 3 Openness to our own limitations has no necessary
substantive implications, but it constitutes the condition within which more
accurate truth-seeking is possible. It is a posture that makes us more
intentional, more disciplined, and more constructively skeptical.
Paradoxically, it makes a difference in the way religious faith can make a
difference: the practice of seeking truth because we believe it is important
to do so can deepen our commitment to the search, even though we can't
always know when, or if, we've found what we're looking for. 04
102. For a version of this approach, see STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE (2001).
103. For the argument that it doesn't matter, see Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of
Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987).
104. See Christopher Schroeder, Foreword, A Decade of Change in Regulating the Chemical
Industry, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 13 n.45 (citing R. NEIBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE 233-41
(1951) (observing that the notion of "unknowable yet indispensable truths is central to many
religions")).
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Some propositions-about law, or moral truth, or the workings of the
physical universe-are simply more true, or more right, than others.1os The
goal of objectivity requires us to search for and seek to identify those
truths. Whether what we find are improved understandings or self-
rationalizations-we won't always be able to tell the difference. But surely
the only hope for more accurate truth-finding lies in the belief in its
possibility, and in the organic brand of self-knowledge and self-discipline
that would be necessary to discern it.
105. As I stated in 1990, in the moral realm:
Propositions such as that I should love my children, that I should not murder others for sport,
or that democracy is .. . better than authoritarianism seem so "essential" to my identity and
my social world that I experience them as values that can never be overridden, even as
standards by which I may judge others.
Bartlett, supra note 42, at 883. Arthur Leff's list is more well-known and perhaps less controversial:
"Napalming babies is bad. Starving the poor is wicked. Buying and selling each other is depraved.
Those who stood up to and died resisting Hitler, Stalin, Amin, and Pol Pot-and General Custer too-
have earned salvation. Those who acquiesced deserve to be damned." Arthur Leff, Unspeakable Ethics,
Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1249 (1979).
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